All of the previously mentioned developments occurred in widely differing policy contexts and institutional settings and involved a wide range of actors. Given this great diversity of situations and the many factors that influence deforestation in complex and often location-specific ways, any sweeping generalization is bound to be misleading. This chapter addresses only one narrow aspect of the issue, the links between technological change in agriculture and deforestation, and abstracts this aspect from the multitude of other factors that affect forest clearing. It uses a simple trade-theoretic framework to analyse those links under various scenarios designed to reflect some of the main deforestation-relevant situations observed in tropical Asia. Its approach is 'macro', rather than 'micro'. Thus, for example, it generally disregards the complications introduced by the intricacies of decision-making in semi-subsistence farm households. Throughout, its emphasis is on highlighting the main linkages and mechanisms that tie developments in other sectors to forestry, rather than on formal rigour.
The chapter focuses on economic agents' responses to incentives stemming from market forces. Admittedly, this approach has strong limitations since non-market factors, including government policies, influence and at times drastically modify incentive structures. Non-market factors are also important in places where farmers who are only partially integrated into markets practise semi-subsistence farming. Nevertheless, this kind of analytical approach still has considerable value and relevance. Market factors dominate large areas of the economy and economic considerations temper government decisions, even if they do not entirely determine them.
Section 2 examines the links between technological change in agriculture and deforestation in a 'neoclassical' economy that produces two goods in two sectors, 'agriculture' and 'forestry', which compete with each other for land and labour. The first scenario in this section involves a small, open economy that faces exogenously determined output prices. The second scenario focuses on situations where technological change can affect output prices by influencing supply and demand.
Section 3 takes into account regional differences in agriculture and the fact that some factors are used to produce certain goods but not others. In the upland region agriculture competes with forestry for land, but in the lowlands it does not. Once again, we have one scenario with exogenous output prices and a second with endogenous output prices. In both cases, wages and land prices are endogenous. After that, we look at what happens when one introduces more labour-intensive forms of technological change. Then we consider situations, albeit in a simplistic fashion, when property rights on forested land are not well defined (or poorly enforced).
Section 4 examines the impact of technological changes in lowland agriculture, such as the Green Revolution. Here we examine not only the implications of different assumptions about output markets and property rights but also the income effects generated by technological change and the impact of technologies biased towards the use of capital.
By varying our assumptions regarding the structure of the economy, how output and factor markets behave and how the forest and agricultural sectors interact, we can obtain important insights about several of the most commonly observed situations involving deforestation in tropical Asia. These include situations where forests compete with internationally traded agricultural commodities, such as oil-palm, rice and rubber, as well as situations where they compete with subsistence crops (e.g. coarse grains) or products orientated to domestic markets (e.g. cool-climate vegetables). There are also important differences between upland agriculture, which directly competes with forests, and lowland agriculture, which for the most part does not. Distinguishing between these two types of agriculture provides richer, and sometimes distinct, insights than those gained from models that treat agriculture as a single undifferentiated sector. Table 17 .1 summaries the different scenarios covered in the chapter and their respective outcomes.
The chapter does not attempt to provide a rigorous welfare evaluation of the outcomes it analyses. How different outcomes affect welfare is not always clear. There are many equity considerations and forests provide important externalities whose welfare benefits are difficult to measure.
Model 1. One Region and Two Sectors
[Our 'base' case draws insights from the standard neoclassical two goods-two factors model (the HeckscherOhlin model). 2 The economy allocates all its resources to producing two commodities, 'forestry products' (F) and 'agricultural products' (A). whose prices are P F and P A , respectively. Even though we call the non-forest sector 'agriculture', if we interpreted it more broadly as the rest of the economy' and assumed it produced a 'non-agricultural' good, that wouId not change the essence of our story.
We have two factors (resources): land (T) and labour (L). The production functions have the usual neoclassical properties. Factor proportions vary in response to factor prices. Both goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive. Production exhibits constant returns to scale. Factors can move freely and without cost between the forestry and agricultural sectors. Property rights are well defined and enforced. Agents have full information, so there are no risks or uncertainties. We abstract from time considerations by using a one-period model. Throughout our discussion we assume agriculture is more labour-intensive than forestry. While we have been unable to obtain reliable data on labour use in forestry, this assumption seems reasonable.
Case 1.1. the small open economy
Our first scenario assumes that the economy is a price-taker in world markets (i.e. 'a small country'). This implies that the world market exogenously determines all output prices. The production possibilities frontier (PPF 0 ) in Fig. 17 .1 represents the maximum combinations of F and A the economy can produce with the initial set of resources and technology. It is concave, because the marginal cost of converting forest to other land uses rises as more area gets converted. Relative prices determine where on the PPF 0 the economy will end up. Given the initial PPF 0 and relative prices in Fig. 17 .1, production will take place at point X 0 and land and labour will be allocated between the two sectors so as to produce F 0 and A 0 .
Fig. 17.1. Technical change and production
Now consider the impact of a productivity-improving technological change in the agricultural sector. We assume for simplicity that technological change is factor-neutral (i.e. that the productivity of both factors increases by an equal amount). The PPF will move out, but not symmetrically: greater output with the same level of factor inputs is possible only in agriculture. The new production point is at a point such as X 1 . At that point, agricultural output is higher than at point X 0 and forestry output is lower. Given that land and labour are the only two factors of production, this implies that both labour and land have moved out of forestry. In other words, deforestation has increased. Clearly, if agriculture becomes more productive, as long as commodity prices remain constant, it is rational to convert more forested land to agriculture. In this setting, a Green Revolution in agriculture will mean more deforestation. Similarly, if only the forestry sector experienced technological change, agriculture would contract.
This conclusion remains valid even though the higher national income that results from technological change increases demand for both agricultural and forest products. Given free trade, this higher demand does not translate into higher prices in a price-taking country. Imports can always meet excess demands at the prevailing international market price.
Technological progress also affects factor prices. Figure 17 .2, which shows the so-called 'iso-profit' curves, illustrates the basic mechanism. These 'iso-profit' curves represent the combination of factor prices that are consistent with zero profits for a given technology and output price, and their shape reflects the elasticity of factor substitution. 3 Zero profits means that industries cannot earn anything more than the opportunity cost of the factors they invest in production. As long as markets are perfectly competitive, in equilibrium, profits must equal zero and factor price ratios must be consistent with that. Otherwise producers would expand production to take advantage of the available profits.
Fig 17.2 Technical progress and factor prices
Technological progress allows each unit of a factor to produce more output. Because profits cannot rise above zero, this implies that producers must pay more for their factors. If technological change caused producers to make profits in the A sector, they would demand more labour and land and bid up factor prices until they reached the point where they could no longer make profits. At the initial production point X 0 , the factor price ratio is (w/r) 0 . However, if technological progress in agriculture shifts the iso-profit curve up and establishes a new equilibrium at a point such as X 1 , factor prices will adjust to (w/r) 1 . As long as agriculture always remains more labour-intensive than forestry and the economy continues to produce both A and F, w will increase relative to r.
Price increases and neutral technological changes have similar effects. They both lead to upward shifts in the iso-profit curve and similar changes in factor returns. If the technological change is not neutral, the new isoprofit curve will still shift upward but will not have the same shape. Its shape will reflect the factor bias incorporated in the new technology, which, in turn, will influence the resulting relative factor price configuration.
Case 1.2: endogenous output prices (Table 17.1)
Consider now the case where output prices are no longer exogenous. This implies that changes in the domestic supply of and demand for agricultural or forest products can affect prices. Consequently, the effects of higher supply and higher demand on agricultural prices will temper the impact of neutral productivity change in agriculture. Following technological change in agriculture, the greater physical productivity of factors devoted to agriculture attracts them to that sector, which expands at the expense of forestry. Technological change increases aggregate output and consequently real national income. This shifts the demand curve for both goods upwards. The magnitude of that shift depends on the income elasticity of demand for each product. At the same time, larger supplies depress prices, by an amount that is determined by the price elasticity of demand. The net impact on price depends on the relative weight of these two effects.
As long as an expansion in agricultural output makes its relative price go down, the relative price line will be flatter when prices are endogenous. Hence, the equilibrium will be at a point to the left of X 1 . This implies that the new equilibrium level of agricultural output will be lower and the associated resource movement effects more muted. In the extreme case of very low demand elasticities for agricultural products, technological progress can reduce agricultural profitability so much via lower prices that ultimately agriculture may use fewer resources (even though its output will be higher than before). This may also be the result if the country is a net exporter of agricultural products and world demand is highly inelastic -the case of so-called 'immiserizing growth' (Bhagwati, 1968) .
Model 2: Two Regions and Three Sectors: Technological Change in Upland Agriculture
Let us turn now to a more complex economy and to the more realistic case where land may not be able to easily move between sectors. In this section, we draw on land-use change models developed by Jayasuriya (1994, 1995) to analyse the interactions between agriculture and forestry when there are two separate types of agriculture. We use the Jones specific-factor model (the Ricardo-Viner model) to examine the question of factor mobility and factors that can only be used to produce certain goods (Jones, 1971 ).
In our new scenario, there are two regions -the uplands and the lowlands, and producers can use land either for forestry or 'upland' agriculture (UA). Hence, UA competes directly with forestry for land. In the lowland, land can used only for 'lowland' agriculture (LA). Hence LA does not compete with forestry for land, although it still competes with forestry for labour.
Our analysis ignores the income effects of technological change in the uplands on the demand for agricultural and forestry products, both for simplicity and because in many real-world situations they are likely to be small. If such income effects were significant, they could alter the pattern of demand and have a particularly strong effect on the prices of non-tradable goods.
Case 2.1: output prices fixed, input prices endogenous
We start with the case where all forestry and agricultural products are internationally traded at prices determined by the world market and face perfectly elastic global demand. This implies that technological change will have no effect on output prices. We also assume that labour is fully mobile between all three sectors. 4
Now consider the effect of a neutral technological change experienced by (and confined to) upland agriculture, UA. 5 Higher productivity in UA increases its profitability. As producers expand their output in response to the higher profitability, this generates a 'resource pull' effect, which attracts resources from other sectors in the economy. Agriculture will pull land (and labour) away from the forestry sector. In other words, there will be more deforestation and labour will migrate from the lowlands to the uplands. As a result, LA output and land values will fall, but national income will increase and wages will rise throughout the economy.
This model captures the kind of mechanisms that are at work in many South-East Asian countries when commercial crops (e.g. rubber, oil-palm) that compete with forests experience technological progress. Typically, these crops are exported and world prices are determined exogenously. Even when domestic supplies affect international prices, as in the case of rubber in Indonesia, coconuts in the Philippines and tea in Sri Lanka, the effect is small, since foreign demand elasticities are high. Hence the price-depressing effect of technological progress is minor. The dominant effect is to make these crops more profitable, which accelerates deforestation.
The extent to which wages increase as a result of technological change in UA depends partly on the elasticity of lowland labour supply. If the lowland sector is large relative to the uplands, UP producers should be able to attract the additional labour they need without increasing wages much. Thus, LA would probably not contract much but deforestation would advance rapidly, On the other hand, if the upland labour market is rather large compared with the lowland labour market, technological change may bid up wages, thus discouraging further deforestation.
Case 2.2: endogenous output and input prices
In this scenario, forestry and lowland agricultural products (e.g. rice) are tradable and the world market determines their price. However, UA either produces solely for the domestic market (e.g. vegetables) or produces for international markets in which the country has significant market power. In such a situation, changes in domestic supply and demand will influence the price of UA products. As long as the income effects are minor, increases in supply induced by technological progress will lower the price of UA products. The degree to which higher deforestation will occur will depend on how much higher supplies lower prices and how farmers respond to the price declines.
Case 2.3: labour-biased technological change
To get some insight into the impact of a non-neutral technological change, consider a situation where UA uses labour intensively and the upland labour supply is fixed (i.e. it cannot be 'imported' from the lowland region). One example might be a case where upland farmers have special skills required for implementing the new technology.
Now consider a technological change that is biased in favour of skilled labour. The adoption of the new technology increases the profitability of UA and the returns to labour. Unless the increase in output supply dramatically depresses prices, the sector will expand and pull in additional labour and land. Land, of course, comes from forests, improving deforestation. But, by definition, the supply of labour is fixed, and this constrains UA's ability to expand. Thus, limited labour availability reduces the scale of deforestation.
In a longer time frame, the new technology will enhance the incentives for acquisition of the upland skills. In such a situation, lowland labour will be encouraged to seek these skills and will demand services that can transfer these skills. Hence, the long-term supply elasticity of labour is likely to be higher and the technology is likely to generate more deforestation in the long term than in the short term.
Case 2.4: ill-defined property rights
So far we have maintained the assumption that forestry is like any other production sector. If forests were commercial plantations, with well-defined and enforced property rights, that might not be unreasonable. But most forests in tropical Asia are on state-owned land. Consider what may happen in the case where deforestation and subsequent conversion of land to agriculture may confer (or enhance the probability of obtaining) property rights to land. One observes such situations in many parts of tropical Asia (Angelsen, 1999) . 6
How technological progress in a given sector affects factor returns depends in general on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how commodity prices respond to changes in supply and demand. As illustrated earlier, in our simple two sector/two factor Heckcher-Ohlin-type economy, neutral technological progress in one sector has similar effects to an increase in its price. Among other things, it increases the price of both factors used in the expanding sector higher land values accelerate the 'race for property rights' (Anderson and Hill, 1990) , since people now have a greater incentive to attempt to establish property rights by cutting down forests and 'squatting'. Hence any improvement in the productivity of agriculture in regions where it directly competes with forestry will accentuate deforestation even more than in situations where producers have well-defined property rights over forested land.
Using this same framework, we can also analyse the impact of higher timber prices in situations where property rights to the forest are not secure. Obviously, if timber prices went up permanently, logging would be more profitable. Thus, in a neoclassical economy with well-defined property rights, forestry would expand at the expense of agriculture. But, even if the higher prices were expected to be 'permanent', without secure property rights, the result would only be increased logging of current tree stocks.
Hence, if logging a forest makes it easier to convert forests to agricultural land, higher timber prices or technological change in forestry may accelerate deforestation rather than reducing it. Since such situations appear to occur frequently in practice, this explains why attractive timber prices may contribute to deforestation in much of tropical Asia.
Model 3: Technological Change in Lowland Agriculture
The 'Green Revolution' in tropical Asia is probably the best-known example of technological change in agriculture in recent years. It was associated with the use of high-yielding rice varieties in 'wet' lowlands and basically bypassed UA (Barker and Herdt with Rose, 1985) . We can consider it an example of technological change in non-directly competing LA and analyse its impact on forests in that framework.
Case 3.1: the small open economy
Initially, we shall assume that LA produces tradable goods, with exogenously determined prices. Since rice has a well-established international market and most tropical Asian countries import or export it this assumption is generally valid. (We would not want to push this assumption too far, however. The inter-national rice market is rather 'thin' and major exporters, such as Thailand and Vietnam, and importers, such as Indonesia, have some market power.)
As long as higher output does not influence prices, the higher productivity in LA wilI always make the sector more profitable. This will raise the marginal product of labour in LA and induce lowland producers to offer higher wages to attract upland labourers. In other words, the Green Revolution will stimulate workers to migrate from the uplands to the lowlands. This process becomes all the more important as barriers to interregional labour mobility come down, a trend that has gathered momentum over time. 7 (if we allowed higher supply to depress the price of LA output, these effects would be dampened.)
What happens to the UA and forestry sectors? The upland economy as a whole will contract, because it loses labour to the 'booming' lowlands. But the impact on the two upland sectors differs. If we hold UA output prices constant, we can think of the uplands as a 'mini-Heckcher-Ohlin economy' whose labour force has contracted. Under these circumstances the Rybczynski theorem tells us that-the more labour-intensive UA sector should contract. This should lead some marginal upland lands to shift from agriculture to forestry, which would be good for forests.
Case 3.2: endogenous output prices
However, if supply and demand changes influence UA output prices, the latter may not stay constant. The higher productivity of LA increases national income. This may raise or lower the demand for UA outputs and consequently influence their price. Such income effects may be quite large: note that the Green Revolution has been credited with a significant decline in real rice prices and rice is the main staple food in tropical Asia.
If UA outputs have low or negative income elasticities of demand, because they are 'less preferred' goods, such as coarse grains, it may take a substantial contraction in UA output to establish a new equilibrium. This would favour forestry. In that case, the negative effects of higher wages on agricultural production will outweigh the offsetting impact of higher demand (due to higher lowland incomes) and resources will flow out of the UA sector. If LA were to be thought of as irrigated rice, then the impact of a Green Revolution in irrigated rice would tend to contract the coarse-grains sector, thereby reducing deforestation.
If, on the other hand, demand for UA output is highly income-elastic (for example, if UA is 'temperate-climate fruits and vegetables'), the demand effect may dominate. Improvements in LA increase people's incomes. This leads them to demand more UA output, the price of which increases. In response, UA will expand and pull resources from forestry, thus aggravating deforestation. Examples of such situations can be seen in some highland areas in Malaysia Sri Lanka.
If higher LA output depresses the price of lowland products and LA and UA products are substitutes. technological change in LA will have two opposing effects on UA. First, the increase in profitability of LA will become more muted. This dampens the labour migration from uplands to lowlands and cases the labour-cost pressure on UA. On the other hand, the lower price of LA output pushes down the price of UA output and makes it less profitable to produce. The degree to which this adversely affects the UA sector depends on the relative strength of these forces. In many parts of Asia, the Green Revolution in rice has made it less attractive to grow substitute food crops in the uplands and this has undoubtedly had a positive effect on forests. However, government policies, such as granting protection to upland food crops, have at times undermined this effect (Coxhead, 2000) .
Case 3.3: capital-biased technological change
Thanks to development strategies centred on promoting industries that substitute for imports, in the past new lowland technologies were often capital-intensive. The capital bias in technology reduces the upward pressure on labour demand and wages and thereby limits the pull of labour from the uplands. As a result, upland labourland ratios remain high, which favours UA over forestry, since the former is more labour-intensive. This leads to greater deforestation than would occur in the neutral technological-change case.
Thus, productivity improvements in LA generate two opposing influences on UA. The cost effect tends to contract it, while the demand effect works to and expend it. The net effect on UA, and hence on forestry products, cannot be predicted a priori. It will depend on the magnitudes of the relevant supply and demand parameters, including the demand for UA produce.
Case 3.4: ill-defined property rights
Now the presence of poorly defined property rights influences the impact of the Green Revolution on forests depends crucially on whether the Green Revolution promotes or discourages UA. If it leads UA to contract, that effect will be less stronger when property rights are poorly defined or enforced, and so deforestation will decrease less than it would have otherwise. Arguably, though not quantified in empirical studies, this impact of the Green Revolution on deforestation has probably been quite important in many parts of Asia. On other hand, in places where the Green Revolution encourages UA, that effect is also likely to be stronger in situations with poorly defined or enforced property rights.
Case 3.5. endogenous forest-product prices
Until now, we have assumed that forestry products have perfectly elastic demand. In many situations, this is not realistic. For example, nearby farm households consume a large part of forest produce in the form of fuel wood and timber. Consider a situation where domestic markets determine the price of forestry produce. To enable us to continue with a simple trade model and to focus on this aspect of the problem, let us now assume that UA produce is internationally traded and has perfectly elastic demand and that there are no property rights problems.
First consider the case where demand for forestry produce declines with income growth. In other words. these products are inferior goods. This may apply, for example, to fuel wood. In this situation, if property rights to forested land are well defined, lowland productivity improvements will have opposing effects on deforestation. Greater lowland employment opportunities will pull labour away from the uplands. As a result, UA, which is the relatively more labour-intensive upland sector, will contract and the forestry sector will tend to expand. However, reduced demand for forest produce will reduce the value of forests and encourage land to shift to UA. The outcome depends on the magnitudes of these forces.
If demand for forestry products (say, timber or amenity values) increases with higher lowland income, that is, they are normal goods, then both effects mentioned in the previous case are pro-forestry. The same basic insight carries through to the case where forested land can be converted to provide an intermediate good into lowland production. For example, upland forests can be cleared to provide irrigation and power, the demand for which increases with lowland growth, and this will tend to increase deforestation.
The lack of secure property rights would again modify these results. An increase in demand for forestry products, such as timber, may again lead to greater deforestation, as the incentives to log the current trees facilitates conversion of forests to agricultural land.
Case 3.6: land mobile between sectors
If it were technically possible to convert land in the upland region to 'lowlands' suitable for producing LA (e.g. convert 'dry lands' into wet rice lands), the incentives to do so would increase when technological progress raises the profitability of LA. Such changes will effectively make land mobile between sectors. This will tend to increase deforestation. Thus it cannot be assumed that more productive lowland technologies will invariably reduce deforestation. Since such technological changes encourage the conversion of uplands to lands suitable for LA, governments (and donors) may be encouraged to pursue schemes designed to produce these now more productive crops, as in the transmigration programme in Indonesia and irrigation-cum-settlement schemes in Sri Lanka, with greater vigour.
Case 3.7: economic growth and interregional labour movements
While we have labelled the non-upland economy as the 'lowland' agriculture sector, it can be considered more generally as the 'rest of the economy' (ROE) and its land endowment can be thought of as composite, sectorspecific capital stock. Many factors can stimulate growth in this sector, such as technological progress, an increase in its capital stock, due to, say, foreign investment, or an increase in the world price of its output. In all such cases, the impact on forestry will be mediated through the two main effects on the labour and commodity markets: the labour pull effect, which attracts labour away from the upland region, and the income growthinduced increase in demand for upland produce. In this framework, faster growth in the ROE will reduce deforestation, provided UA does not produce a highly income-elastic product, whose price might increase as per capita incomes go up.
If legal restrictions on regional labour mobility (such as in China) or socio-economic factors hindering labour mobility (such as costly transport) make more difficult for workers to move from the highlands to the lowlands, the labour pull effect becomes weaker. Under such circumstances, lowland producers must pay wages high enough to overcome the 'transport cost' to attract upland labour. This reduces demand in the lowland region for labour originating in the upland. The reverse occurs when labour relocation costs are lowered.
A similar observation can be made with respect to commodity markets, if Interregional transport is costly. Reductions in these barriers to mobility -due, for example, to better roads, communication facilities, etc. -all tend to increase the impact of ROE developments on the uplands. The pro-forestry effect of ROE with increases with greater market integration.
The rapid economic growth in many parts of Asia has probably had its most important pro-forestry impact via the labour market. The pull of labour way from the uplands has probably strongly reduced the incentives to convert forests to food agriculture, though government policies that actively encouraged competing agriculture (e.g. agricultural settlement schemes such as the transmigration programme in Indonesia) have often counteracted this impact.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have used a number of situations observed in tropical Asia to motivate a simple tradetheoretical analysis of the implications of technological progress in agriculture. The models have recognized the factor and commodity market linkages between agriculture, forestry and other sectors in the economy, which serve as conduits through which technological progress and other changes in one sector transmit their influences throughout the economy.
We have ignored many aspects of the deforestation problem to focus on a few (in our opinion, quite important) issues. For example, our analysis does not consider the impacts of externalities and policy-induced distortions, and we have therefore refrained from making a welfare assessment of the outcomes. We also largely ignore the role of policy-induced distortions in both commodity and factor markets, which not only modify the impact of technological progress, but also influence the nature and pace of technology generation and adoption. 8 The analysis is static and does not explicitly address issues related to market imperfections (including missing markets). Thus we abstract from time-related issues as well as expectations, imperfect information and risk/uncertainty considerations. We treat property rights only in a very limited manner.
Despite these many limitations, even this simple analysis sheds light on some of the main mechanisms through which technological progress in agricultural sectors has an impact on deforestation, and helps to identify some important factors that condition the nature of that impact. In particular, it shows that the impact of technological progress in agriculture on forestry depends crucially on the degree to which agriculture that experiences such technological change directly competes with forestry for land. Thus, productivity improvements in crops such as rubber, tea, oil-palm or coffee, which are likely to compete for forested land, will aggravate deforestation, while the Green Revolution in wet rice agriculture, which reined in real food prices and increased agricultural employment, may have had a significant pro-forestry effect. However, the effect of low prices for food produced in the lowlands may not always be benign: lower food prices raise incomes and can stimulate demand for upland products, which may lead to increased deforestation. 2 See any standard international economics text for the complete set of assumptions and properties of this model.
3 For an exposition in an agricultural setting, see Coxhead (1997) .
4 Our 'upland' region is similar to Angelsen's (1999) model fit, 'the small open economy with private property', but unlike in model III our wage rates are endogenous.
5 Here we draw on the so-called 'booming sector and Dutch disease econoniiWA literature (see Corden, 1984) .
6 For trade-theoretic models that analyse the impact of open access to forested land, Brander and Scott Taylor (1994) and Deacon (1995) .
7 For evidence from the Philippines, see David and Otsuka (1993) .
8 The wider issue of technology generation in a distorted policy environment is addressed by Coxhead (1997) .
